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metaphysics the question must be regarded as an open one, though in a certain sense it "gives us hope" by showing the lack of cogency in the arguments directed against the doctrine (pp. 354 ff.). The unsatisfactory nature of certain discussions of this division — *e. g.*, the account of the place of the finite self in reality, and the objections urged against the conception of the Absolute as a self — may be readily seen to be consequences of the author's fundamental view of experience, some of the defects of which I have already attempted to point out.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Gemeinverständlich nach den Quellen. Von A. DÖRING. Leipzig, O. R. Reisland, 1903.—Vol. I, pp. xii, 670; Vol. II, viii, 585.

The perennial interest of Greek Philosophy, not only for the thinker who desires to prosecute his quest of truth with due knowledge of what others have thought before him, but also for the layman in whatever walk of life, explains the persistent effort of historians to bring the lessons of the beginnings of occidental thought to the general reader. Professer Döring announces this purpose in the title of his book, while laying claim to a first-hand study of the documents. It is only fair to say that the work is what it purports to be; and in general the success of the author may be highly commended.

Dr. Döring believes that the twentieth century is to be an age of philosophy, as a guide to life, not for a select few but for all; and that the history of philosophy is the best propædeutic to philosophy itself. In particular he regards Greek Philosophy as a vigorous sketch of thought, covering in a fresh and vital way all of man's essential problems. Hence his desire to make it accessible to all.

There is little that is novel in the plan or in the general execution of the work. Consistently with the author's purpose, there are no notes, but the scholar is enabled, by inserted references to Zeller and Diels, to verify the statements of the text. Believing that philosophy proper relates to the quest of happiness, the author is led to regard the pre-Socratic period as merely preliminary, or to emphasize unduly such scattered opinions belonging to it as refer to matters ethical.

"Die antike Philosophie ist hoch aktuell." This is profoundly true; and it is due to this fact, more than to any other, that the student never wearies of considering it. The remark is far more applicable, however, to the pre-Socratic, than to later periods of Greek thought. Hence we never quarrel with the historian who gives it a disproportionately large amount of space. If later periods were treated at equal length, measured by the extent of the surviving documentary evidence, a history of Greek thought would be a most unwieldy thing. Fortunately all historians follow this custom. The result is almost invariably that the reader lingers over the pre-Socratics and hurries over the rest. How many stop to inquire why this is so? To me it seems clear that the reason is this: A thought is interesting to one in proportion as its presuppositions, its consequences, and its relations to other thoughts, are brought out. This can be done only when a system is studied in detail, and the aroma of the 'aktuell' is quite lost when a philosophy is stated in the summary and highly abstract way common in histories of thought.

Of course there is a peculiar fitness in considering the pre-Socratics thus curiously. It is not always borne in mind that they forged almost all the instruments of philosophy in the concrete; the abstract formulation, with full emphasis on the word abstract, came later. But for good or ill the conceptions of concrete things and processes were fairly fixed by the close of this period. Aristotle probably did not originate a single purely physical notion; he merely combined and refined, with the aid of criticism, ideas delivered to him by the pre-Socratics. The same is true likewise of the post-Aristotelians. The only new contributions came in the sphere of the ethical and the religious; and even here the notions, if diligently pursued, will be found to rest in no small number on the physical conceptions of the pre-Socratics.

Professor Döring has shown a praiseworthy desire to define precisely these notions that serve as the foundation for the stately superstructure of later philosophies. I am sure that he will pardon a former pupil for addressing himself particularly to this part of the large work; for the discussion may thus be kept concrete, and the necessarily abstruse statements in regard to subsequent systems may be passed over. I fancy most readers will welcome such a plan with a certain sense of relief.

A few remarks of a general character may first be made. Professor Döring, in common with most writers on Greek thought, admits a degree of discontinuity in the development which I am unable to acknowledge. Our author does much to reduce this quantum, but there still remains so much that one is disturbed by it. I may be permitted to specify a few points. First; there is the question inherent in the term hylozoic or hylopsychic, namely: What conception had these thinkers of the nature of the 'eternal motion' which seemed to them given with the fact of matter? The first suggestion to a modern mind is that they were spiritualizing matter. But is that true? I know of no other way to answer this question but to inquire of later Greek thinkers. Aristotle regarded the world as a ζῷον: did he therefore think of the motions in the cosmos as otherwise than mechanically conditioned? The question arises in connection with Anaxagoras's Νοῦς. Are we to suppose that its operation is capricious or non-mechanical, because it is intelligent and realizes ends? Döring would seem to think so, though there is no evidence to support the view. One phase of this question will be discussed below. I may say that I know of no mode of operation recognized by the pre-Socratics which is not purely mechanical in its conception. This does not, of course, imply that their notions are always based upon true views of the phenomena; but it does imply that they always had in mind *some* natural phenomenon and an explanation of it in accordance with natural methods.

Another illustration is that of the supposed transformation of one form of matter into another. Döring's view — and it is not peculiar to him — is that this doctrine was held by philosophers rather generally until the time of Parmenides; after Parmenides this becomes an impossibility. Aristotle is authority for this conception, and it is difficult to refute him. But Döring does discredit him (I, 244) when he brings forward this notion as belonging to Leucippus. Why, then, should one accept it of Anaximander? And if one rejects it for him, what becomes of the ἄπειρον conceived as 'an unitary, qualitatively indeterminate infinite,' as Döring assumes it to be, following Theophrastus? Why should one adopt one set of meanings for the terms ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ἀποκρίνεσθαι, etc., when applied to Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists, and another, when applied to Anaximander? It is well known that Aristotle was fain to discover such a qualitatively indeterminate substance in the πάντα ὁμοῦ of Anaxagoras, and that his followers thought to find it in the chaos of Love in the system of Empedocles. If we rightly reject these notions, why should we not do the same for Anaximander? It is surely more rational to suppose that the searching dialectic of Parmenides induced a sharper definition of processes already accepted than that it led to a totally changed view of nature's operations. All this depends finally upon the assumption that Aristotle's conception of qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις) was commonly held by the pre-Socratics. To me it seems clearly an erroneous assumption that may be readily disproved. In that case, the history of pre-Socratic thought will have to be rewritten.

I shall now take up a number of special points suggested by Professor Döring's account. One naturally turns to his chapter on Heraclitus, to see whether he has added anything to our knowledge of this thinker. I fear the answer must be in the negative. At several points (pp. 89, 93, 98, 101) War is mentioned not quite consistently as the way downward and again as the condition of the world. Is it possible to form a clear conception of what Heraclitus meant? The Eudemian Ethics 1235 a 25 ff., relating how Heraclitus rebuked Homer for wishing that strife might perish from among gods and men, says that a harmony would not be possible without the existence of high and low notes, nor living beings without the existence of male and female, which are contraries. Now the interest of this lies in the fact that the male and female are clearly chosen merely as representatives of the Pythagorean tables of contraries, just as Parmenides used them (fr. 12, Diels). Parmenides further illustrates the thought in that he brings in the divinity Love at this juncture, because she is the genius presiding over *μίξις* (composition). Love and War are proverbially much alike. Empedocles united the two principles Love and Strife, making them virtually, what they doubtless were in the systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides, obverse and reverse aspects of the same process of composition and decomposition. Empedocles was probably as well aware of this as Aristotle, who taunted him with it. The two become distinct only at the extremes of the process, — in other words, only when there is, strictly speaking, no world. That War in Heraclitus means composition by means of interchanging effluences is sufficiently shown by Lucretius, II, 574, V, 381, 392, if we are content to let one system of Greek Philosophy throw light on another. Compare also Heraclitus, fr. 53, with Empedocles, fr. 21, 12; 23, 8; and see also Heraclitus, fr. 67, 83. See also Laert. Diog. IX, 7, *διὰ τῆς ἐναντιοδρομίας ἡρμόσθαι τὰ ὄντα* and Aët., I, 7, 22, *εἱμαρμένην δὲ λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἐναντιοδρομίας δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄντων.*

If one takes this point of view, the coexistence of opposites is easily explained. Professor Döring says (I, 99) that, though this doctrine is not to be regarded as contravening the principle of non-contradiction, as some ancients supposed, it came perilously near doing so. One has only to think of such a doctrine as that of Democritus (Theophrastus, *De sensu*, 63, 67) accounting for the relativity of perceptions by the assumption of a mixed constitution of things, in order to see that the logical principle has nothing to do with the case.

Another conception of Heraclitus that deserves some consideration is that of Death as an expression for change (see fr. 36, 48, 62, 76, 77). What idea underlies this figure of speech? I think it is this same notion of composition and recomposition by effluvia. There is not now space enough to argue the point, but a word or two may suffice. The soul, as we know, was regarded by Heraclitus as an exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις). Here we are clearly brought into relation to the conception of life as connected with respiration — inspiration beginning life, expiration ending it. See the notion of the breathing of the world in Anaximenes and the Pythagoreans (*cf.* Lucretius I, 999–1001), and compare Melissus, fr. 7 and 8, and Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. 4. Death is the loss of the vital breath, the loss of something very fine and invisible, but none the less material.

This brings us to the larger question of the significance of exhalations in the system of Heraclitus, and indeed in the pre-Socratics generally. So far as I am aware, nobody has studied this question exhaustively. But it seems clear that to the phenomena of evaporation are due some of the most striking developments of Greek Philosophy. First, there is the notion of a separation of a primeval chaos into its constituents arranged in order of gravity. Evaporation typifies the upward, precipitation the downward way. The connection of this phenomenon with the observation of the effects of eddying waters and whirlwinds affords the key to most of the Greek cosmologies. But, again, evaporation played a leading rôle in the thought of Heraclitus, we are told, not only in regard to the upward and downward paths, but especially in regard to concrete things. The conclusion seems inevitable that it was in the phenomena of evaporation that Heraclitus found the hint of the system of effluences, which, with their ceaseless activity in entering one combination after another, he bequeathed to subsequent philosophies as his most valued legacy. Empedocles converted it into the scheme of ἀπορροαί and idols, which the Atomists appropriated, though they forged from this raw material the finished product of their corpuscular theory. Who will undertake to say that Heraclitus and not his predecessors, the Milesians, took the first step toward the development of atomism? In an evolution as uninterrupted as that of the pre-Socratics, it is hazardous to venture more than a guess in such a case.

I am tempted to say something in opposition to Professor Döring's interpretation of the 'measures' (μέτρα) of Heraclitus; but I hasten on to speak of other matters.

Several points relative to Empedocles may next engage our attention. Dr. Döring says (I, 202) that everything did not, according to Empedocles, contain all of the elements. This may or may not be true. I incline strongly to think that *within the cosmos* there is an universal mixture (cf. Diels, A. 32 and 48). My chief reason for thinking so is that, according to the principle enunciated by E., that only like can act on like, an universal mixture was necessary in order to make interaction possible between things in the world. The supposed cases, in which Empedocles mentions less than the four elements in giving the composition of substances, really prove nothing, because they will all be found to include water, which is conceived by him as a vehicle or carrier for the rest.

Love and Hate are spoken of as mythical forces (I, 203, 207), as if that made their operation any the less mechanical. Why will writers reiterate this statement, when they are well aware that Empedocles, following Parmenides, spoke of the four elements likewise as gods (I, 209)? Are we then to regard these also as mythical and capricious beings? It ought to be clear that, except for the names, none of these powers has any suggestion of personification.

The elemental air is said to be different from the atmospheric air (I, 205). It depends on what is meant by 'different.' Empedocles certainly held that the atmosphere, like the thing we call the earth, was a mixture, whereas elemental air and earth were of course, as elements, homogeneous. It is in the former sense that fire, air, water, and earth may be said periodically to encroach on one another (fr. 17, 29; 26, 1 ff.). The same is true of Anaxagoras (see I, 219). This consideration probably accounts for the difficulties concerning *αἰθήρ* (see I, 204), which is now equivalent to *πῦρ* and again (in the doxographers) to *ἀήρ*. It is likely that Empedocles called the pure (elemental) fire, at least occasionally, by the name of *αἰθήρ*: hence its place in the cosmos as the *flammantia mœnia mundi* followed by fire (more or less mixed with air).

Professor Döring speaks of this firmament and of the moon as '*glasartig*' (like glass), resulting from an original melting process (I, 205, 207). I think he clearly misinterprets the adjective *κρυσταλλοειδής*. The occurrence of *ὑαλοειδής* proves nothing to the contrary, because ice is typical of crystalline formations generally, and hence anything crystalline may on occasion take its place. The word here means ice-like, and the notion is one that one meets frequently in ancient thought. *Strom.* (*Dox.*, 582, 12 ff.) says that the moon arises from air enveloped by fire, and solidifying like hail. I do not profess to understand the details of the explanation offered by the Greeks, but the conception in general is clear. Fire was thought to be especially instrumental in solidifying things. Thus it is responsible for the hardening of the earth (fr. 73). Again, we meet the notion that a beverage can be more speedily frozen or cooled, if it is first heated. For the function of fire in connection with the formation of hail, see Arist., *Meteor.*, A. 12.

We may next consider a number of points in regard to the system of Anaxagoras. On page 218, Dr. Döring says that not one of the 'seeds' is like the other, referring to fr. 4 and 12 (end). The case is similar here to that above mentioned touching the putative distinction between the elemental and the atmospheric air in Empedocles. Anaxagoras distinctly says (fr. 8) that his description refers to the condition *in the cosmos.* This does not exclude, therefore, an essential or even an absolute homogeneity of the homœomeries in themselves; rather the very conception of these elemental substances postulates just this. Within the world, however, everything but the *Νοῦς* contains somewhat of every other, the differences arising from the varying proportions. This is the principle of individuation; as in the system of Diogenes of Apollonia, the individuality of things depends on the precise point they occupy in the scale reaching from the rarest to the most dense.

Professor Döring accepts without protest Aristotle's description of the *πάντα ὁμοῦ* as 'a unitary, indeterminate mixture of the substances' (I, 221). It is hardly necessary to say, after the discussion above, that this conception is both in itself self-contradictory and inconsistent with the very foundations of Anaxagoras's system. It is clearly the result of Aristotle's singular attempt to reinterpret the thought of his great predecessor in a sense admitting of his favorite doctrine of qualitative change (*ἀλλοίωσις*), due in all probability to Anaxagoras's use of the verb *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*, though in the sense of change by composition. Compare Arist., *Phys.*, 187a 26 ff., and *De gen. et corr.*, 314a 11 ff., with the tractate *Περὶ Διαίτης*, c. 4, Zeller, I, 696.

Again, Professor Döring sees in the results of the vortex motion induced by the *Νοῦς* (I, 224 f.) evidence of a non-mechanical operation of that agency, working teleologically. According to our author, the dense and the heavy ought, by the operation of the centrifugal force, to be carried to the circumference, the rare and the light remaining at the center; whereas the opposite is assumed to be the case. Professor Döring seems to be much impressed with this thought, for he glances at it again (I, 204). Nothing is farther from the thought of Anaxagoras than a power working otherwise than by mechanical necessity. He had in mind the observed effects of rotating water and of whirl-winds (see Arist., *De cœlo*, 295a 9 ff.), where the heavier bodies tend toward the center. This observation clearly exerted a powerful influence on early Greek cosmologies, presumably much earlier than the time of the Atomists, to whom Gomperz appears to attribute this discovery (*Griechische Denker*, I, 273).

Another instance in which Dr. Döring finds a non-mechanical intervention of the *Νοῦς* (I, 225) readily admits of an intelligible explanation. Our author thinks it strange that the earth does not, in consequence of this vortex motion, assume the shape of a sphere, but is regarded as a flat disc. I conceive the reason to be as follows. The rotary motion is of course thought of as taking place in a plane; hence the sediment, so to speak, collects at the center in the form of a circular mass in the same plane. This would of course leave the earth in the form of a disc. That this was the reasoning of Anaxagoras seems to be substantiated by another point. The disc-shape of the earth was accepted also by Anaximenes, to whom Anaxagoras was largely indebted. Now we are told that Anaximenes taught that the stars (doubtless carried by the great vortex) *moved not above or under the earth, but around it.* Anaxagoras held, furthermore, that the earth's inclination to the ecliptic came after the formation of the earth itself. If we had full accounts instead of the poor fragments we possess of the opinions of the pre-Socratics, we should probably find that both thinkers held all of these points of doctrine. I fancy, therefore, that all of those philosophers (certainly the later ones) who did not regard the earth as spherical shared this view. It is suggestive, at any rate, that all of the philosophers (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, Leucippus, and Democritus) who are quoted by the Doxographi on the obliquity of the ecliptic, held that the earth had the disc-shape. I cannot say by what means the obliquity of the ecliptic was supposed by Anaxagoras to have been brought about, but have no doubt it was a mechanical means.

The limits of the space allotted me forbid further details. I trust they may be received as evidence of my interest in the discussion of these philosophers by our author. He has made an honest effort to envisage the highly concrete thought of the pre-Socratics, and in so doing has rendered a real service to historical science. It is not to be expected that one will accept his interpretation in all particulars, and indeed the reviewer has found himself dissenting quite as often as agreeing. The work possesses nevertheless much merit, and will be read by many who do not relish histories of the more conventional type. If comparisons must be made, it should be said that it is neither so sound nor so brilliant a study as that of the Greek thinkers from the pen of Gomperz.

In conclusion it must be said that the volumes lose much of their possible value for the scholar by reason of the almost innumerable errors in the references to authorities.

W. A. HEIDEL.

IOWA COLLEGE, GRINNELL.

L'expérience morale. Par F. RAUH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1903. —pp. 246.

La morale et la science des mœurs. Par L. LÉVY-BRUHL. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1903.—pp. 300.

Both these works deal in effect with the topics that are usually dealt with in the introduction to a treatise on ethics, — the character, scope, and method of the science. Such methodological discussions have a keen interest of their own, but it is an interest which must be admitted to be of a rather limited, subtle, and technical kind. It is not a direct interest in the matter of the science, but a secondary or reflective interest in its form. Probably the student would lose very little, he might even gain a good deal, if 'introductions' were either omitted altogether, or relegated to the position of the 'postscript which should have been a preface.' Abstract discussions of method are all very well, if they are undertaken from an interest in logical system and principle. But if they are undertaken, not in the interest of logical reflection upon a science already so far constructed, but in the direct interest of scientific construction itself, then it is very desirable they should be as brief as possible, for after all the best way by far of proving how a science should be made is to make it. "The constant whetting of the knife is tedious, if it is not proposed to cut anything with it." The works before us seem to me to illustrate, each in its own way, the truth of this saying and the dangers of such abstract preliminary discussion. They are far too long, diffuse, and over-elaborated. They expand into a volume what could have been said in a few introductory chapters, and what would, besides, have been said with far more effect, if there had been any substantive and constructive work behind it.

M. Lévy-Bruhl's book is an elaborate argument for the Comtian position that ethics must be based on historical sociology, that a rational art of social practice must be dependent upon a previous science of social laws. Of course even this previous science has yet to be constructed. Regarded simply as an academic exposition and defence of a particular philosophical position, the book has conspicuous merits. It is always clear and straightforward in style, careful